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Abstract 
The study of how crime affects different income groups faces several difficulties. The 
first is that crime-avoiding activities vary across income groups. Thus, a lower 
victimization rate in one group may not reflect a lower burden of crime, but rather a 
higher investment in avoiding crime. A second difficulty is that, typically, only a small 
fraction of the population is victimized so that empirical tests often lack the statistical 
power to detect differences across groups. We take advantage of a dramatic increase in 
crime rates in Argentina during the late 1990s to document several interesting patterns. 
First, the increase in victimization experienced by the poor is larger than the increase 
endured by the rich. The difference appears large: low-income people have experienced 
increases in victimization rates that are almost 50 percent higher than those suffered by 
high-income people. Second, for home robberies, where the rich can protect themselves 
(by hiring private security, for example), we find significantly larger increases in 
victimization rates amongst the poor. In contrast, for robberies on the street, where the 
rich can only mimic the poor, we find similar increases in victimization for both income 
groups. Third, we document direct evidence on pecuniary and non-pecuniary protection 
activities by both the rich and poor, ranging from the avoidance of dark places to the 
hiring of private security. Fourth, we show the correlations between changes in protection 
and mimicking and changes in crime victimization. Fifth, we offer one possible way of 
using these estimates to explain the incidence of crime across income groups. 
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I. Introduction 
Previous work on the economics of crime has found it hard to estimate the relationship 
between income and crime victimization. One important difficulty is that crime-avoiding 
activities vary across income groups.  As Levitt (1999) explains:  
 
“…the natural tendency is to calculate the extra burden borne by the poor as 
a result of higher crime victimization. Such a calculation, however, would 
ignore the fact that individuals distort their behavior in costly ways (for 
example, by moving to the suburbs, investing in security systems, or not going 
out after dark). Any measure of the burden of crime should incorporate not 
only the costs of those victimized, but also the investment made to avoid 
victimization. For example, if crime avoidance is a positive function of income 
(Cullen and Levitt (1999)), then ignoring costs of avoidance will understate 
the true crime-related burden felt by the rich (Levitt, 1999, p. 88). 
 
Thus, a lower victimization rate in one group may not reflect a lower burden of crime, but 
rather a higher investment in avoiding crime. The data on crime avoiding activities 
required for a proper calculation, however, are not part of the official statistics collected 
by the police and are rare in victimization surveys. Another serious difficulty is that only 
a small fraction of the population is usually victimized, and there are no sharp changes in 
victimization rates, which make it hard to design tests with sufficient statistical power to 
detect differencial changes across income groups.  
 
We tackle the question of how an increase in crime is distributed across income groups 
using a crime survey where people are asked about their victimization experience, crime-
avoiding activities, and income levels. In normal times, such a strategy would be 
impractical. But Argentina experienced during the 1990s and in particular during the year 
2001 a sharp increase in crime rates, giving salience to the problem of crime. Official 
statistics, for example, show that the main categories of crime more than doubled (at 
least) in Buenos Aires during the 1990’s, in spite of a reduction in crime reporting rates. 
In a relatively short period of time, the main cities of the country experienced striking 
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increases in crime, making crime either the main or one of the main concerns of the 
population according to opinion polls. Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
crime wave was accompanied by a significant growth in private security protection and 
other crime avoiding strategies. 
 
Our survey confirms that there was a large, statistically significant increase in crime over 
the period of analysis. The total victimization rate, which stands for having been a victim 
of a crime at home or in the street, went up approximately 24 percentage points. We use 
this victimization survey to obtain several estimates of interest. First, significant 
differences are observed across income groups. The poor (i.e, those below our estimate of 
the median income in the sample) experience an increase in the total victimization rate of 
28 percentage points, while the rich (i.e., those above the sample median) experience an 
increase of 19 percentage points. In other words, the poor have experienced increases in 
victimization rates that are almost 1.5 times larger than those experienced by high-
income people. 
 
We then study whether this could be explained by differential crime avoidance by the 
rich. One piece of indirect evidence is obtained by studying victimization categories 
where the cost of changes in behavior (i.e., adaptation) differs. For example, changing 
behavior to avoid street robbery (for example by avoiding dark places or by mimicking 
less attractive targets) costs less money than changing behavior to avoid home robbery 
(for example by hiring private security).1 An important finding is that robberies in the 
street, where the rich cannot do better than mimic the behavior of the poor, show similar 
increases in victimization for both income groups. For home robberies, where the rich 
can protect themselves with expensive protection devices, we find larger increases in 
victimization rates amongst the poor. The size of this differential impact is large. Early in 
the 1990’s, rich individuals report victimization rates that are more than double those 
reported by the poor. But by 2001, high-income respondents report victimization rates at 
home that are smaller (in fact they are only 75 percent of those reported by the poor). 
 
                                                 
1 The use of personal bodyguards on the street is exceptional. 
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A third finding of the paper concerns direct evidence on crime-avoidance activities by 
high and low-income groups. For mimicking strategies, we consider avoiding the use of 
jewelry and avoiding dangerous places. For protection strategies, we consider the use of 
alarm and the hiring of private security. We cannot reject the hypothesis of broadly 
similar changes in mimicking across high and low income groups, but we estimate a 
significantly larger increase in protection activities by the rich.  
 
Fourth, we then estimate the correlation between victim-adaptation measures and crime 
victimization in panel regressions. We find a negative correlation between individual 
private protection measures and home crime victimization rates, controlling for 
individual and period fixed effects as well as neighborhood specific-period effects . We 
also offer some tentative arguments that can be used in a causal interpretation.  
 
Finally, the paper concludes with a short section illustrating one possible use of these 
estimates to construct an indicator of the burden of crime across income groups. We 
observe, for example, that street crime allows for mimicking and other low-cost forms of 
victim adaptation, and that street crime has evolved similarly for rich and poor. Thus, it 
appears safe to assume that the burden of street crime is similar for both groups under  
the assumption of negligible mimicking costs. For home robbery, the data paint a 
different picture. Consider a given increase in victimization at home. On the one hand, 
high and low income groups protect themselves at different rates. Interpreting our 
estimates of protection on home robbery as causal, we note that the rich are predicted to 
have avoided almost all of the crime increase (indeed, the difference between the 
predicted victimization rate and zero is not significant). We note that this is consistent 
with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the rich (which exhibits no 
detectable change). On the other hand, and again under a causal interpretation of our 
estimates, the poor are predicted to have avoided a small part of the increase in crime. We 
note that this is inconsistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the 
poor, which shows a large increase: the predicted rate of home robbery for the poor is 
less than half of what is actually observed. We conjecture that this is the result of a 
negative externality arising from the home protection of the rich. 
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Previous empirical work in this area is not large. There is certainly some work pying 
considerable attention to analyzing how income distribution or unemployment rates are 
relate to crime levels. It is hard, however, to translate the results in these papers, often 
involving aggregate measures, into a differential effect across income groups from a 
given increase in crime.2 A more convincing approach relies on the use of relatively 
disaggregated data. Levitt (1999), for example, uses data on crime rates across Chicago 
neighborhoods as well as data from the US National Crime Victimization Survey over the 
period 1970-90 to study a similar set of issues. He finds that property crime in the United 
States became more concentrated among the poor by approximately 60 percent. In a 
related spirit, Gaviria and Pages (2002) study victimization rates for 17 countries in Latin 
America between 1996 and 1998 and present a simple model where potential victims 
have the possibility of protecting themselves. They show that crime in Latin America 
tends to affect mostly rich and middle class households living in larger cities. There is 
relatively little work on victim adaptation, although interesting recent work by Lott 
(1998) has explored the possibility that potential victims protect themselves through 
concealed handguns (see also Lott and Mustard, 1997 and Duggan, 2001), while Cullen 
and Levitt (1999) study urban flight as a response to high rates of city crime. A related 
issue is that criminals maye respond to victim adaptation, for example by switiching to to 
other areas or other crimes. Hesseling (1994) reviews the literature on crime 
displacement (see also Cornish and Clarke, 1987). Levitt (1999) explains several 
limitations of previous work, including those emerging from the lack of information on 
crime avoidance activities. 
 
Section II briefly describes the theory that illustrates the effect of increases in 
victimization across income groups when victims can adapt. Section III describes our 
                                                 
2 Levitt (1999) provides a partial survey, and cites systematic reviews of the literature by Land et al (1990) 
and Patterson (1991). While empirical work on the issue of private protection is rare, theoretical work 
includes Shavell (1991), de  Meza and Gould (1992) and Koo and Png (1994). See also Becker (1965, 
1968), Ehrlich (1973), Witte (1980), Freeman (1996), Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger (1994), Papps and 
Winkelman (2000), Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000, 2002), Garcette (2001), Dal Bo and Dal Bo 
(2004), Mocan et al (2005), inter alia. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) discuss the high crime rates in cities, 
while Londono et al (2000) discuss property crime relative to violent crime in Latin America. 
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data and empirical strategy. Section IV presents our basic set of results, while Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. A Theoretical Illustration of Crime with Victim-Adaptation 
 
When crime increases, high-income citizens can protect themselves through the 
acquisition of expensive alarms or the hiring of private security devices. If this occurs, it 
is possible that low-income households suffer the main increase in victimization. We 
illustrate these ideas using a simple, one-shot game.  
 
Start by assuming a continuum of agents with indexed ability xi distributed following 
G(.). There are two decisions: i) to work (and earn wi=xi) or to become a criminal; and ii) 
to set up an (observable) security system at cost c, or do nothing in this regard. One 
simple way to derive equilibrium crime is to assume that a friction exists in the labor 
market, so that wages below f cannot be paid legally. This means the fraction G(f) 
become criminals to avoid starvation. 
 
For simplicity, we assume that the security system is fully effective and that wealth is not 
observable, so that criminals distribute randomly among unprotected agents.3 Then, 
people set up a security system if  
 
( )pwcw ii ->- 1 , 
 
where p the probability of victimization is equal to 
 
( )
)( *wG
fG
p = , 
and where the cut-off w* is defined as 
                                                 
3 The assumption of fully effective protection seems strong, but we note that private security booths are 
patently observable, while the main companies installing alarm systems also place a sticker on the main 
entrance with the legend “this house is fitted with an alarm system by xx” where xx is the name of the 
company. This is in contrast to the car protection system (Lo Jack) studied in Ayres and Levitt (1998).  
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( )
cw
wG
fG
=**)(
, 
and where agents with *wwi ³  hire security systems.
4 For simplicity, we assume thieves 
do not hire private security and we rule out multiplicity assuming G(w) is concave for 
w>f. 
 
Note that when the predisposition for crime increases, for example because the friction f 
becomes larger, the consumption of security systems increases (agents with lower wi now 
protect themselves). And because protection is a normal good (and assumed to be 
effective), increases in crime lead the distribution of crime to become concentrated on 
lower income groups. Indeed, the probability of victimization for the unprotected 
increases on two accounts. First, the total number of criminals increases. And second, the 
number of unprotected targets is lower as more citizens hire private security. The 
concentration of crime increases on the group of poor individuals is all a consequence of 
crime displacement taking place due to higher investment in protection. In summary, the 
model yields the following predictions:  
 
· The use of private security devices increases with the number of criminals. 
· The use of private security devices concentrates on rich households.  
· The poor suffer the main burden of crime increases. 
 
The predictions of this simple model can be compared to our data on the evolution of 
crime in Argentina during the 1990s. At a relatively low unemployment rate, crime was 
low. As unemployment rates soared in the mid 90’s, the rich increasingly payed the costs 
of hiring private protection. This behavioral response allowed the rich to avoid 
victimization, so that subsequent increases in unemployment continued raising the crime 
levels experienced by the poor. Crime rises as a result of the increase in the number of 
criminals (due to, say, higher unemployment), but it concentrates disproportionally in 
                                                 
4 Note that if the security system cost c is too high nobody hires private security, as it may happen for street 
protection. Also note that we allow thieves to become victims themselves.  
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poor neighborhoods as high-income neighborhoods hire private security devices (which 
constitutes a negative externality on the poor).5  
 
III. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
III.a. Design and Data Description  
Design 
A household victimization survey is the main source of information for this study.6 The 
target population of the study was the population of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area. 
The questionnaire was performed to 200 households in the City of Buenos Aires and 200 
households in the suburban Great Buenos Aires through telephone interviews. In 
addition, 100 street interviews were performed to people that declared not to have a home 
telephone line. The survey collected information on victimization events, crime reporting, 
behavioral responses to crime, consumption of private protection, possession of durable 
goods and assets, and demographic household information. Note that official crime 
statistics do not typically collect such data, so that their inadequacy (for the purposes of 
this paper) goes beyond the usual difficulties arising from victim underreporting or 
political manipulation. 
 
Although the survey was cross-sectional, it asked households to report retrospective 
information for the entire decade (1990-2001). However, retrospective information is 
sometimes subject to recall bias. Thus, the survey was designed exploiting several 
techniques specially developed to minimize this nuisance. First, the information set was 
restricted to major crime events: armed robberies and forcible entry into homes. The 
restriction to major events significantly reduces typical recall bias of retrospection, which 
is mainly associated to “microscopic” events (see Aday, 1996, and Reuband, 1994). 
Moreover, we concentrate on whether the household has been victim of a crime during a 
                                                 
5 Gaviria and Pages (2002) present a related model of crime protection, but without displacement. Dal Bo 
and Dal Bo (2004) analyze a general equilibrium model of appropriation which predicts a positive  
association between crime and inequality that can naturally be applied to study the changes during a period 
of economic reforms such as those occurred in Argentina during the 1990s. Fajnzylber et al (2002) 
document such a positive correlation.   
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period of time, but not on the number of times this has occurred. We should expect that 
recall bias has a larger effect on the latter, than on the former. Additionally, the 
retrospective information was asked sacrifying precision about the exact year of 
occurrence of an event, but gaining confidence by considering longer time periods. Thus, 
the survey considered three periods: 1990-1994 (the first part of the decade with one-digit 
unemployment rates and strong growth), 1995-2000 (the period after the Tequila crisis 
with the unemployment rate around 15% -after a peak of 18.3%- and a declining 
economy after 1998), and the final year of 2001 (with an unemployment rate of 18% that 
then reached 21.5% in early 2002, with the default of the external debt and the end of 
currency convertibility). Moreover, the survey used bounded recall procedures to reduce 
underreporting of crime events that took place in previous periods (see, among others, 
Aday, 1996; Sudman et al 1984). More importantly, our main question is which group 
has been mostly affected by the increase in crime levels. As this question refers to the 
relative changes in victimization rates rather than the levels, the results will not be 
affected by recall bias if this bias affects both groups (rich and poor) similarly. 
 
A final data issue is that the measure of income levels is a delicate matter because some 
people decline to reveal their income in a survey. Income questions could be particularly 
sensitive in a survey about private security. Instead of asking directly about income, the 
survey addressed this problem by asking questions on education level, ocupation, and 
availability of cars, appliances (PC, air conditioner, and automatic washing machine), and 
credit cards, in order to infer income levels from these variables. The opinion poll 
company, following the methodology developed by Argentine Marketing Association 
(1998), provided us with an index of income level that collapses all the indicators of 
household education, ocupation, and wealth into a continuous variable. Appendix 1 
shows the details of this methodology. We define a household as rich if its income index 
is equal or above the median in our sample, and poor otherwise. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 The survey was performed in 2002 by the opinion poll company Catterberg & Asoc. for the IDB Poverty 
Reduction and Social Protection Network. 
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Data 
Our research strategy is based on exploiting the salience of crime in Buenos Aires after 
the sharp increases in crime during the second half of the 1990s and in particular during 
the year 2001. Table 1 shows that 10.2% of the households interviewed by the survey 
suffered a home robbery (forcible entry into their house) during 2001. This percentage 
was the same for the whole period 1995-2000, and 7.9% for 1990-1994. Only 43.1% of 
these crimes were reported to the police in 2001, but the figure was larger in the previous 
years (45.1% for 1995-2000, and 74.4% for 1990-1994). For robberies outside the home, 
34.6% of the individuals in our sample declare that at least one member of the household 
has been robbed during 2001. This percentage was 27.5% for 1995-2000, and 10.0% for 
1990-1994, suggesting that there was a significant increase in victimization rates (note 
that the question refers to periods of different length). The reporting rate of this type of 
crime tends to be lower than for home robberies, but it is also decreasing (36.8% for 
2001, 46.7% for 1995-2000, and 51.1% for 1990-1994).7 
 
These reporting rates confirm that, because of victims’ tendency to underreport, official 
figures underestimate crime levels.8 Indeed, this problem worsens during crime waves, 
because crime reporting falls as crime increases. Moreover, the rich are significantly 
more likely to report crimes at home than the poor, although there were no significant 
differences in the reporting of street crimes across income groups.  
 
Consistent with this evidence of sharp crime increases, Table A in Appendix 2 shows a 
growing feeling of insecurity in the population. The exact question asks “In your 
neighborhood, would you say that insecurity with respect to one decade ago has 
increased a lot, some, a little, has not changed at all, or has decreased?” The answers 
show that 68.8% of individuals think that insecurity increased some or a lot over the 
previous decade. Less than 1% of respondents find that insecurity decreased. 
                                                 
7 These crime and reporting rates are consistent with other victimization surveys performed in the Buenos 
Aires metropolitan area. For example, a survey performed by the Justice Ministry reports that 41% of the 
respondents declared to have suffered a crime during 1999, but only 29% of those crimes were reported to 
the police (Ministerio de Justicia, 2000). 
8 Soares (2004) shows that the positive links between crime and development arise because of increases in 
crime reporting. 
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Our research strategy requires changes in crime of the magnitude observed in Argentina 
between 1990 and 2001 for two reasons. First, it gives us some confidence that crime has 
“salience” as an issue to individual respondents so that the information produced through 
the administration of surveys has reasonable accuracy and reliability. Second, it is 
statistically possible to detect differences across groups (in this case following income 
lines) without extremely large samples. 
 
Finally, to provide some evidence on the potential presence of recall bias affecting our 
results we exploit two extra survey questions. The survey first asked the number of times 
a member of the household had been robbed on the street during the period 1990-94. At 
the very end of the questionnaire, the survey then re-asked the number of times a member 
of the household had been robbed on the street during 1990-92, and during 1993-94, 
something that allows us to control for the consistency of the responses. There is a high 
level of consistency among respondents. The correlation between the sum of the 
responses to these two final questions and the previous response for the whole period is 
0.9). Additionally, note that our empirical strategy is based on comparisons across 
income groups, which will not be affected by recall bias as long as this bias is 
uncorrelated with income levels. The correlation between our income level index and the 
difference between the original report of crime and the ex-post report is very low (0.02). 
 
III.b. Empirical Strategy 
In this paper we test several propositions regarding the relationship between victimization 
and income. We first study differences in the change in crime rates across income groups. 
Specifically we test: 
 
    DCrimerich = DCrimepoor   (1) 
 
against the alternative hypothesis of different crime rates for the two groups, and where 
DCrimegroup denotes the change in the crime rate for group=rich, poor from 1990 to 2001 
considering the three sub periods 1990-94, 1995-2000 and 2001. Given that the periods 
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have differing lengths the meaning of having the value of 0.1 (which stands for having 10 
percent of the respondents victimized) in two different periods means different things. 
This makes it transparent that we believe that historical victimization rates taken from 
memory must be taken with care when used to make absolute statements across periods, 
such as the amount of crime has increased (although it can partially be done). Instead, we 
are confident in making statements about differences across groups in a given period, 
where victimization rates are strictly comparable, and also in conducting difference-in-
differences analysis which exploits the differential change in victimatization between 
groups, and for which the change in the length of periods, and hence the likelihood of the 
realization of the event of interest, is affected equally for rich and poor.9  
 
Another test concerns differences in the way potential victims adapt across the two 
income groups. A variety of victim strategies are possible. First, victims may actively 
protect themselves in such a way that it is more costly for criminals to access the bounty 
and get away with it safely. A typical example is the hiring of a private security guard, 
but it also includes the use of alarms and locks. A second possibility is that potential 
victims may change their behavior in order to passively reduce the likelihood of suffering 
a crime. A typical example is the case of potential victims of crime who avoid certain 
high-risk activities (walking alone on the street versus walking in groups). Potential 
victims may also reduce the expected cost of crime by carrying less money or jewels, 
both because this reduces the cost of any given crime and also because the probability of 
suffering a crime is lower. In the latter case victim adaptation can take the form of 
mimicking, whereby members of some group resemble the potential victims of another 
group with a lower probability of suffering a crime. For example, carrying fewer jewels 
makes a rich individual (with lots of money in his wallet) resemble a poor individual 
(with a thin wallet), where the latter are less attractive to criminals.  
 
                                                 
9 This is analogous to the widely conducted studies in education that exploit panel data of test scores, where 
the inherent difficulty of the exam changes from year to year. These analyses also assume that this potential 
problem is controlled by the inclusion of year fixed-effects in the regression equations. See, Lavy (2002), 
Galiani et al (2006), inter alia. 
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As a first approach to testing for the existence of victim adaptation, we study different 
types of crime where some forms of adaptation are not possible. For example, it is 
extremely hard to use protection to reduce crime on the streets. Although some extremely 
rich individuals use bodyguards, this is absolutely exceptional in Argentina. The type of 
adaptation to reduce such crimes is likely to be cheap, such as walking on the part of the 
street where there is light, so it is likely to be used by both income groups. However, the 
use of security guards and alarms as protection for crimes against property (home) is 
more expensive and likely to be used more intensively by the rich. In other words, we test 
 
   DCrimeTyperich = DCrimeTypepoor  (2) 
 
where DCrimeTypegroup denotes the change in the crime rate of type=street, home and for 
the  group=rich, poor over the relevant time period. The expectation is that the change in 
street crime becomes similar for both groups when victims adapt. In contrast, since 
private protection is more likely to be purchased by the rich, we expect the change in 
home crime to be greater for the poor when victims adapt. 
 
We complement this evidence with direct information on activities that denote 
adaptation.   
 
    DActivityrich = DActivitypoor   (3) 
 
where DActivitygroup denotes the change in the activity for the group=rich, poor over the 
relevant time period. The expectation is that the change in activities that involve 
protection at home (security guards and alarms), or a reduction in expected crime costs 
(avoid carrying jewels, or credit cards, and avoid dark and dangerous places) are more 
intensive for rich individuals. 
 
The final empirical exercise of the paper is to estimate the effect of changes in behavior 
(DActivitygroup) on crime victimization (DCrimeTypegroup). Although individual, period 
and neighborhood period effects are included, it should be noted that an obvious 
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difficulty in estimating such a relationship is the possibility of reverse causality. 
Accordingly we explore some arguments that can be used in a causal interpretation of the 
estimates we present.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
IV.a. Total Victimization Rates (at Home plus in the Street) 
Figure 1 shows that approximately 15 percent of our sample declares to have been the 
victim of crime (either in the street or at home) at least once during the period 1990-94. 
This goes up to almost 35 percent during 1995-2000 and to almost 40 percent during the 
year 2001. This survey evidence is consistent with the crime increase documented in 
official statistics and the media. The official statistics reveal that the number of criminal 
acts reported to the police in the city of Buenos Aires went up from 2,039 per 100,000 
people to 6,633 in the year 2001, an increase of 225%. Property crime for the same 
period went up from 1,685 per 100,000 to 4,687, an increase of 178%. 
 
More interesting is Figure 2, where total crime is separated by income group using our 
index for income levels. The rich start the decade with double the victimization rate than 
the poor (22 percent versus 11 percent, a difference that is significant at the 1 percent 
level). By the year 2001, the rates had risen to approximately 40 percent and where 
statistically indistinguishable. Statistical tests are presented in the Table 2. 
 
The evidence suggests that the poor have been the recipients of most of the increase in 
crime. The increase in crime for the poor has been approximately 1.5 times that suffered 
by the rich. The difference-in-differences change of the victimization rates between the 
first and last period of our study is significant at the 5 percent level. As a comparison note 
that, for the US, Levitt (1999) finds that property crime has become more concentrated on 
the poor over time. The magnitude of our finding is in line with his estimates. He reports 
that while in the 1970’s high-income households were slightly more likely to be 
burglarized than low-income households, by the 1990’s low income households were 60 
percent more likely to be the victims of crime. 
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IV.b. Victimization Rates at Home and in the Street 
Figures 3 and 4 separately present the evolution of two different types of crime, at home 
or in the street, where victim adaptation is likely to differ by income group. Indeed, some 
of the possible behavioral responses at home involve costly actions (alarm, etc.) whereas 
those on the street appear to be cheaper (avoid the use of jewelry). Thus, a different 
response in the two crime categories would be indirect evidence of victim adaptation.  
 
Figure 3 studies the evolution of victimization rates for street robberies across income 
groups. The difference-in-differences analysis for robberies suffered by household 
members outside the house is presented in Table 3. For the three periods, high-income 
households suffered a higher victimization rate than low-income families. The cross-
sectional difference seems significant (at the 10 percent level of statistical significance) 
for the three periods. Moreover, both groups have suffered a significant increase in crime 
levels. Difference-in-differences tests, however, are never statistically significant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that the evolution of victimization rates have not differed 
across income groups. 
 
Figure 4 studies victimization at home, while the accompanying table (Table 4) presents 
the associated tests. For the period 1990-1994, high-income households suffered a home 
victimization rate that was more than double that observed by low-income families (11 
percent versus 5 percent). After that period, low-income households suffered a significant 
increase in victimization likelihood, while high-income families show a non-significant 
decline. The cross-sectional difference becomes insignificant in those subsequent periods. 
Thus, the victimization rate of the low-income households caught up to the high-income 
rate during the decade. Importantly, the difference-in-differences tests show that the 
change in the victimization rate of the low-income group is significantly different from 
the change for the high-income households. 
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IV.c. Adaptation at Home and in the Street 
A possible explanation for these differing crime dynamics by income group is that 
victims adapt. Figures 5-8 with their corresponding tables present four possible forms of 
adaptation. The first two involve costly investments in self-protection devices (hiring 
private security and buying alarms) while the last two involve a change in behavior that 
reduces the exposure to crime. Figure 5 focuses on the hiring of private security guards, 
an industry that grew substantially during the 1990s in Argentina and that affects home 
robbery. The answers to our survey question reveal that few households hire private 
security in the early part of the decade (7 percent of the rich versus 2 percent of the poor). 
By the year 2001, the hiring of private security had grown 16 percentage points amongst 
the rich and 8 percentage points for the poor. The difference in these changes in 
protection is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
A similar picture of differential adaptation emerges from studying data on installing 
alarms, a cheaper form of protection at home (see Figure 6 and the corresponding Table). 
Relatively few respondents declare to have alarms installed in the early part of the sample 
period (10 percent of the rich versus 2 percent of the poor). By the year 2001, 25 percent 
of the rich and 8 percent of the poor have alarms. The change for the rich (15 percentage 
points) is larger than the increase for the poor (6 percentage points) and the changes 
between groups are statistically different at conventional levels of significance. 
 
There are only a limited variety of strategies that people can employ to avoid becoming a 
victim of a robbery outside their houses.10 We consider avoiding dark places and 
avoiding the use of jewels. Figure 7 shows that both income groups have adapted by 
avoiding dark places as crime rates increased. More than 60% of the interviewed people 
declare to avoid dark places by the year 2001. There do not appear to be differences in 
the adoption of this strategy between poor and rich individuals, as Table 7 confirms. 
 
                                                 
10 In the sample, 173 households declared that one of its members has been robbed outside the house during 
2001. Those robberies took place on the street (125), in a car or public transportation (27), at work (3), in a 
shop or restaurant (15), at a bank or ATM (2) and other places (1). 
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We have a second measure of adaptation on the street, namely avoid using jewels. Early 
in the sample period only 11 percent of the sample declared avoiding the use of jewels, a 
rate that is similar across income groups (although presumably the stock of jewels is 
larger amongst the rich). By the year 2001, 47 percent of the rich, and 37 percent of the 
poor declare to purposely avoid using jewels. The difference for the two groups is 
significant and, more importantly, the differences across income groups in the change in 
Avoid using Jewels are significant. 
 
An alternative explanation for the differing crime dynamics by income group is that 
public officials might have biases against the poor in the provision of police services (see 
World Bank, 2000). The evidence, however, is not consistent with this hypothesis. First 
note that in Argentina, public police provision is not decentralized at the county level. 
Although the police told us that they purposely avoid cross sectional differences,11 it is 
still possible that political economy considerations (but not directly based on local tax 
collection) can lead to more intense public police deterrence in rich neighborhoods.12 
However, note that such political economy aspects would explain the observed crime 
dynamics only if the differential deployment of police on rich versus poor areas changes 
over time. The survey also allows to explore the presence of differential public police 
provision, as it included information on police protection by asking at which frequency 
police walks or drives in front of people’s houses. Table B in Appendix 2 presents the 
survey responses on public police protection which reveal no differences in the treatment 
and protection that the poor receive from the police relative to the rich.  
 
IV.d. The Impact of Victim Adaptation on Home Robbery 
Our data allows us to estimate correlations between the adoption of protection measures 
and victimization at home. Table 9 presents the results for having private security and 
having an alarm. All regressions include household fixed effects, and two estimates are 
                                                 
11 We conducted a series of interviews with key informants, including several officials at the Security 
Ministry, the chief of the Federal Police during part of the 1990’s, a former federal judge, a former federal 
prosecutor, amongst others. 
12 Garcette (2001) studies how crime victimization is distributed across income groups. He finds that crime 
victimization inequality increases in the income of the pivotal voter who sets the level of expenditure on 
public protection.  
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reported for each protection device, one that controls for period fixed effects and one that 
controls for zone of residence-period fixed effects. In order to conduct this analysis we 
divide the Buenos Aires metropolitan area into seven zones of residence. The correlation 
is negative and significant. Both protective devices appear to reduce the likelihood of 
victimization at home in a given period of time. When entered together in the regression, 
private security appears to be 20% more effective than the use of alarms, but the 
difference is not significant at conventional levels. The last two columns produces the 
same results aggregating the two measures of home protection into to an index of security 
devices at home –i.e., the average value of the private security and alarm dummy 
variables.13 
 
Obviously, caution must be exerted when giving these correlations a causal 
interpretation.14 However, we note that the obvious sources of confounding effects are 
controlled for in the models we estimate. One potentially serious issue in relating the 
adoption of protection measures and victimization is that some people are both more 
likely to be victimized and also more likely to use security devices irrespective of the 
causal effect of the latter on the former. This problem, however, does not interfere with 
our estimates because we are including individual fixed effects in our models. We also 
believe that our estimates do not reflect a tendency for people to protect themselves in the 
presence of a crime wave because we are including period fixed effects. Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, the inclusion of zone of residence-period fixed effects also 
controls for the possibility that our estimates are biased-downward because of a tendency 
                                                 
13 An alternative specification following the approach in the literature on technological horizontal spillovers 
(for a recent example see Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) and the references cited therein) exploits differences 
in average protection across our 7 zones. Accordingly, we added to our baseline model (column 7 of Table 
9) the average level of protection of the rich by zone of residence interacted with a dummy that equals one 
if the household is classified as rich. The coefficient on the Aggregate Level of Security Devices at Home 
(which is simply the average for the zone) is negative, although only significant at the 10 percent level. The 
coefficient on Index of Security Devices at Home is still negative and significant. Indeed, its size is very 
similar to that reported in the corresponding regression in Table 9, column (7). 
14 For the causal effect of the introduction of fixed and observable police protection, a technology that 
resembles private security protection, see Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004). They also discuss potential 
crime displacement induced by observable security guards, whereas Ayres and Levitt (1998) show positive 
externalities from the use of unobservable protection devices. 
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for people who live in areas where there is a particularly large increase in crime to protect 
themselves.15 
 
Table 10 presents some further evidence that is relevant to provide our estimates with a 
causal interpretation, by investigating whether exposure to crime in previous periods 
predicts the adoption of security devices. The negative and insignificant coefficient does 
not suggest a reverse causality. 
 
IV.e. One Possible Calculation for the Burden of Crime (using Home Robbery) 
These estimates can be used to approximate the burden of crime suffered by the different 
groups. Indeed, it is possible to start with the estimated model in Column 7 of Table 9 
and note that in this estimated equation the 2001 period fixed effect is equal to 0.04 (t-
value = 2.03). This gives us a measure of the overall increase in home victimization for 
the period 1990-2001 in the absence of any adaptation by victims.  
 
We first focus on the implications for the rich. Given that the increase in the Index of 
Security Devices at Home for the period for the high income group was in fact 0.154, we 
can conclude (under a causal interpretation of our estimates in Table 9) that protection 
helped the rich reduce crime by 0.028 (0.028=0.183*0.154) and hence avoid 70 percent 
of the exogenous increase in crime (0.7 = 0.028/0.04). This means that the rich are 
predicted to have avoided almost all of the crime increase. A formal test of the hypothesis 
that the reduction in crime as a result of protection is in fact 0.04 is not rejected at 
conventional levels of statistical significance [F(1, 996) = 1.38]. We note that this is 
consistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the rich: The change in 
home robbery between 1990 and 2001 for the rich is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (see Table 4). Thus, the evidence is broadly consistent with the 
                                                 
15 Strictly, this analysis is only correct for home victimization because the measures of adaptation refer to 
the stock (e.g., whether people use alarms or hire private security), whereas our measures of adaptation on 
the street refer to changes (e.g, to avoid using jewels, not the absolute amount of jewelry that people use). 
Such changes are not necessarily related to stocks (those that do not have jewels can only trivially “avoid 
using jewels”). In an attempt to conduct a similar analysis for street victimization, we regressed street 
victimization on the changes in avoiding using jewels and avoiding dark places, household fixed effects 
and period (or zone of residence-period) fixed effects. These changes were never statistically significant, 
neither when entered alone nor when both changes were included together.  
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hypothesis that the rich homes avoided the Argentine crime wave by increasing their 
level of protection. 
 
On the other hand, and again under a causal interpretation of our estimates, the poor are 
predicted to have avoided only a small part of the increase in crime. The increase in the 
Index of Security Devices at Home for the period for the poor was 0.065, so protection 
helped the poor reduce crime by 0.011 (0.011=0.065*0.183) and hence avoid 27 percent 
of the shock in crime (0.27=0.011/0.04). We note that the predicted increase of 0.029 
(=0.04-0.011) is inconsistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the 
poor because Home Robbery for the poor increases by 0.07 (see Table 4). In other words, 
the predicted rate of home robbery for the poor is less than half of what is actually 
observed.  
 
We conjecture that this discrepancy is the result of a negative externality arising from 
home protection by the rich. Indeed, the excess of crime observed for the poor over the 
predicted rate is 0.041, which is consistent with the rich avoiding all the increase in crime 
which gets diverted to the poor (we do not reject the null hypothesis of full displacement 
at conventional levels of statistical significance [F(1, 966) = 0.2]. Of course, this is just 
one way to decompose the changes in crime in our sample. But it highlights the main 
message of our simple model, whereby after a large exogenous increase in crime, the rich 
protect themselves avoiding all the effect of crime while the poor receive more crime 
than otherwise as a result of the displacement or negative externality generated by the 
rich.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
An important question in the literature on crime concerns the relative impact amongst the 
rich and poor of a given increase in crime. The observed victimization rates for the 
groups are insufficient to derive the differential welfare burden of crime because 
individuals change their behavior in costly ways in order to avoid crime. The extent of 
such investments to avoid crime is likely to differ across income groups. If the rich have 
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more resources to invest in crime protection, ignoring victim adaptation will obscure the 
burden of crime suffered by the rich and the externalities they impose on the poor. In this 
paper we provide several elements that are relevant to evaluate these effects.  
 
We take advantage of a dramatic increase in crime that took place in Argentina during the 
1990s using a survey that asked individuals their victimization rates and their investment 
in crime avoidance, both at home and on the street. We obtain several findings of interest:  
 
1. During the period leading up to the economic crisis of 2001, crime increased more 
for the poor than for the rich. The increase in the total victimization rate for the 
poor was 1.5 times the increase in total victimization observed for the rich. 
 
2. Changes in victimization in the street were similar for both income groups. In 
contrast, the increase in victimization at home was larger for the poor than for the 
rich. Indeed whereas in the early part of the decade, victimization at home for the 
rich was significantly larger than for the poor, in the year 2001 they were similar 
(if anything it was somewhat larger for the poor). This pattern is suggestive of 
victim adaptation because the cost of adaptation is lower on the street relative to 
home. 
 
3. Direct evidence on victim adaptation reveals a different pattern across income 
groups. The rich are significantly more likely to hire private security and to install 
alarms than the poor. Adaptation on the street presents a different picture. The 
rich and the poor report similar increases in the avoidance of dark places. The rich 
report a larger increase in the avoidance of using jewels (although we expect them 
to start out with a higher level of jewelry). 
 
4. We report a negative correlation between victimization at home and the use of 
alarms or private security, even after controlling for household fixed effects, for 
period-fixed effects and for the interaction of zones and period-fixed effects. We 
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also report that previous experience with victimization at home is not correlated 
with the adoption of security devices. 
 
5. We illustrate one possible use of these measures to estimate how victims’ 
behavior affects the distribution of the crime burden across income group. We 
observe that street crime has evolved similarly for rich and poor. Given that 
victim adaptation on the street (e.g. mimicking) is likely to be cheap, it appears 
safe to assume a similar burden of street crime for both groups. For victimization 
at home, and under a causal interpretation of our estimates, we note that the rich 
are predicted to have avoided almost all of the crime increase. This is indeed 
consistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the rich (which 
exhibits no detectable change). On the other hand, the poor are predicted to have 
avoided a small part of the increase in crime. This is inconsistent with the 
observed dynamics of home victimization for the poor, which exhibits a large 
increase. Indeed, the predicted rate of home robbery for the poor is less than half 
of what is actually observed, which is consistent with full crime displacement 
from the rich to the poor.  
 
6. Given that our estimates show that the changes in behavior induced by higher 
crime rates differ across income groups, and that victimization evolves differently 
across income groups, it seems important to investigate further the extent to 
which victim adaptation to changed circumstances in the crime “market” involves 
a negative externality on one particular group. 
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Appendix 1: Computation of the Income Level Index following Argentine Marketing 
Association (1998) 
 
The Income Level index (IL) assigns a point average for each household according to 
three variables. The index can take values between 4 and 100 points. The variables and 
the maximum values are summarized in the following table:  
 
 
VARIABLE 
MAXIMUM 
POSSIBLE VALUE 
- Education 32 
- Occupation 40 
- Wealth 
a. goods and services 
   b. automobile 
 
14 
14 
Total 100 
 
Assignment of Points for each variable 
 
1. Educational level of the household head. The values vary from 0 to 32 points 
according to the following table: 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL POINTS 
No studies 0 
Primary School Incomplete 5 
Primary School Complete 9 
High School Incomplete 13 
High School Complete 17 
Vocational School Incomplete 19 
University Incomplete 22 
Vocational School Complete 27 
University Complete 31 
Postgraduate Studies 32 
 
2. Occupation of the household head. The assigned points range from 4 to 40 according to the 
following table: 
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NON-EMPLOYEE POINTS EMPLOYEE POINTS 
Do Not Work 
Asset Holder 
 
Self-Employed 
Day Laborer 
Other Non-Specialized job 
Retailer without Employees 
Technician/Specialized worker 
Independent Professional  
Other Self-Employed 
 
Employer 
1-5 employees 
6-20 employees 
21 or more employees 
 
 
20 
 
 
4 
11 
18 
24 
30 
17 
 
 
30 
36 
40 
Domestic Employee 
Family Worker without Fixed Income 
Non-Qualified Operator 
Qualified Operator 
Technician / Foreman 
Low Hierarchy Employee 
  Public Sector 
  Private Sector 
Middle Hierarchy Employee 
  Public Sector 
  Private Sector 
High Hierarchy Employee 
  Public Sector 
  Private Sector 
Top Hierarchy Employee 
  Public Sector 
  Private Sector 
7 
13 
9 
17 
23 
 
12 
17 
 
19 
24 
 
26 
30 
 
28 
37 
Note: 2/3 of the points of his/her last occupation are assigned to unemployed, retired or 
pensioner household heads. 
 
3. Wealth. 
a. Goods and services. It measures the household capacity of accumulation of goods and 
services. The points are assigned according to the following table. 
NUMBER OF THE FOLLOWING GOODS AND SERVICES 
OWNED: PC, AIR CONDITIONER, CREDIT CARD AND 
AUTOMATIC WASHING MACHINE 
Points 
0 0 
1 3 
2 7 
3 11 
4 14 
 
b. Automobile: the questions asked are concerned with (i) the number of automobiles 
owned, (ii) the branch, model and age of the first automobile, if applies, and (iii) the 
branch, model and age of the second automobile, if applies. Using this information, 
points are assigned separately for each car according to the following table. 
BRANCH/MODEL AGE 
INFERIOR MEDIUM SUPERIOR 
10 and more years 1.5 2 2.75 
Between 6 and 9 years 3.5 6 6.5 
Between 3 and 5 years 5.5 7 8.5 
Less than 2 years 6.5 8 9.5 
 
Finally, the automobile point assignment must satisfy the following two rules: (1) if the 
final number of points is between 1 and 3, then zero is assigned to this category; and (2) 
if the sum of the points assigned for both cars together reaches 15 points or more, then 14 
is assigned to this category. 
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Appendix 2: 
 
Table A – Perceived Insecurity 
In your neighborhood, would you say that insecurity 
with respect to one decade ago has increased a lot, 
some, a little, has not changed at all, or has decreased? 
Rich Poor 
 Increased a lot 35.2% 38.5% 
 Increased some 29.7% 27.1% 
 Increased a little 13.7% 8.2% 
 No change 14.8% 20.9% 
 Decreased 0.4% 1.2% 
 No answer 6.2% 4.1% 
 
 
Table B – Frequency of Police Patrolling 
How often do the police usually patrol 
your street? 
Rich Poor 
 Every day 50.4% 43.9% 
 Twice or three times a week 10.9% 12.7% 
 Once a week 5.5% 6.1% 
 At least once a month 4.7% 6.6% 
 Less than once a month 2.7% 2.9% 
 Never 11.7% 16.0% 
 No answer 14.1% 11.9% 
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Table 1 – Victimization and Reporting Rates 
 Home Robbery Street Robbery 
 Victimization Reporting Victimization Reporting 
     
1990-1994 0.08 0.74 0.10 0.51 
1995-2000 0.10 0.45 0.28 0.47 
2001 0.10 0.43 0.35 0.37 
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Figure 1: Total Victimization Rates 
(Street or Home Robbery) 
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Figure 2: Total Victimization Rates 
(Street or Home Robbery) 
 
 
Table 2: Total Victimization Rates (Street or Home Robbery)  
 
[2001]-[90-94] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[95-00] 
Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Rich 0.22 0.38 0.41    
Poor 0.11 0.30 0.39    
Diff 0.12 *** 0.09 **  0.02 Rich-Poor 
S.E. (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 - 0.11 ** 
(0.05) 
- 0.05  
(0.05) 
- 0.07 
(0.06) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Figure 3: Street Robbery Victimization Rates 
 
 
Table 3: Street Robbery Victimization Rates  
 
[2001]-[90-94] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[95-00] 
Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Rich 0.12 0.33 0.38    
Poor 0.08 0.22 0.31    
Diff 0.05* 0.11*** 0.08* Rich-Poor 
S.E. (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
- 0.04 
(0.06) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Figure 4: Home Robbery Victimization Rates 
 
Table 4: Home Robbery Victimization Rates  
 
[2001]-[90-94] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[95-00] 
Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Rich 0.11 0.10 0.09    
Poor 0.05 0.10 0.12    
Diff 0.06 *** - 0.00  - 0.03 Rich-Poor 
S.E. (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
- 0.09 *** 
(0.04) 
- 0.06 * 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Figure 5: Victim Adaptation at Home  
Hiring Private Security 
 
 
Table 5: Victim Adaptation at Home: Hiring Private Security 
 
[2001]-[90-94] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[95-00] 
Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Rich 0.07 0.22 0.23    
Poor 0.02 0.07 0.10    
Diff 0.05 *** 0.15 *** 0.13 *** Rich-Poor 
S.E. (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
0.08 *** 
(0.03) 
0.10 *** 
(0.03) 
- 0.02 
(0.01) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Figure 6: Victim Adaptation at Home  
Alarms 
 
 
Table 6: Victim Adaptation at Home: Alarms 
 
[2001]-[90-94] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[95-00] 
Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Rich 0.1 0.21 0.25    
Poor 0.02 0.05 0.08    
Diff 0.07*** 0.16*** 0.17*** Rich-Poor 
S.E. (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.006 
(0.01) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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 Figure 7: Victim Adaptation on the Street 
Avoiding Dark Places  
 
 
Table 7: Victim Adaptation on the Street: Avoiding Dark Places 
 
[2001]-[90-94] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[95-00] 
Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Rich 0.14 0.46 0.58    
Poor 0.19 0.46 0.60    
Diff - 0.06 * 0.00  - 0.02 Rich-Poor 
S.E. (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
0.04  
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
 - 0.02  
(0.03) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Figure 8: Victim Adaptation on the Street 
Avoiding Using Jewels 
  
 
 
Table 8: Victim Adaptation on the Street: Avoiding Using Jewels 
 
[2001]-[90-94] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[95-00] 
Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Diff-in-Diff 
(S.E.) 
Rich 0.11 0.40 0.47    
Poor 0.11 0.27 0.37    
Diff 0.01 0.13***  0.11** Rich-Poor 
S.E. (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
 - 0.03  
(0.03) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: The Impact of Security Devices on Home Robbery 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Private Security -0.124 ** 
(0.048) 
-0.112 ** 
(0.048) 
  -0.118 ** 
(0.049) 
-0.103 ** 
(0.050) 
  
Alarm   -0.085 * 
(0.052) 
-0.106 ** 
(0.052) 
-0.063 
(0.052) 
-0.086 * 
(0.053) 
  
Index of Security Devices  
    at Home 
      -0.183 *** 
(0.065) 
-0.190 *** 
(0.065) 
         
Period Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Zone-Period Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 1472 1471 1475 1474 1457 1456 1457 1456 
Notes: OLS regressions, standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include household fixed effects. The dependent variable is Victimization at  
Home.
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Table 10: The Impact of Lagged Crime on the Adquisition of Home Security Devices 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
Lagged Home Robbery -0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
   
Period Fixed Effects Yes No 
Zone-Period Fixed Effects No Yes 
Number of Observations 970 970 
Notes: OLS regressions, standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include household fixed 
effects. The dependent variable is the Index of Security Devices at Home 
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